The European Economic Community\u27s New Measures against Unfair Practices in International Trade: Implications for United States Exporters by Atwood, James R.
JAMES R. ATWOOD*
The European Economic Community's
New Measures Against Unfair Practices
In International Trade: Implications
For United States Exporters
In a move likely to intensify trade battles between the United States and
Europe, the European Economic Community has adopted new measures to
deal with unfair trading practices of non-member countries.1 The measures
provide a complaint mechanism by which European firms may challenge
trade practices of other countries and obtain retaliatory action by the
Commission and Council of Ministers of the Community. In rough form, the
measures parallel section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act in the United States.
2
The Community views the new measures as strengthening its hand within
the dispute-settlement framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) 3 and, more generally, as providing a potentially swift and
powerful tool in trade disputes with the United States and other countries.
'This comment summarizes the new Community measures and considers,
however preliminarily, their implications for the United States firm engaged
in international trade with the European Common Market. The measures
bear watching, for they are likely to increase the hazards of selling into
European markets.
*Mr. Atwood is a partner in the law firm of Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.
1. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2641/84, 27 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 252) 1 (Sept. 17,
1984) [hereinafter cited as Reg. 2641/84].
2. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a).
3. E.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, arts.
XIX & XXIII, 61 Stat. A3, A58-60, A64-65, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, amended by Protocol
Amending the Preamble and Parts II and III of the GATT, done at Geneva, Mar. 10, 1955,
8 U.S.T. 1767, 1786-87, T.I.A.S. No. 3930.
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I. Regulation 2641/84 and its Background
Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome4 provides generalized legal authority
for the Commission and the Council of Ministers, working jointly, to de-
velop a common Community commercial policy in the sphere of interna-
tional trade. Regularized procedures were previously adopted under Article
113 to implement Community policy in particular trade areas, most particu-
larly in disputes concerning dumped or subsidized imports 5 and in the
development of common rules on imports.6 But until now, no comparable
procedures existed to address the situation where a non-member country
was engaging in a trade practice which-in the Community's eyes-was
unfair to Community trade. Such situations could be handled by the Com-
munity only on an ad hoc basis under the general provisions of Article 113,
which left neither the Commission nor the Council with clear authority to
press a matter to prompt resolution. Compared to procedures utilized by the
Community's trading partners-particularly the United States-the Com-
munity felt that it lacked effective measures to move decisively against
unfair trade practices of others.
Regulation 2641/84 was the response. It was drafted by the Commission
following a 1982 Council request that the Commission develop procedures
which would enable the Community to act "with as much speed and effi-
ciency as its trading partners" in the protection of trading interests and "to
defend vigorously the legitimate interests of the Community in the appropri-
ate bodies." 7 The Commission undertook a formal study of the trade-
protection measures of other countries, of the kinds of trade practices which
might warrant Community response, and of the procedures which would
best fit the Community's legal structure and traditions.' A draft regulation
was provided to the Council in February 19839 and, after debate and
modification, was approved by the Council in April 1984. Final adoption
was delayed until September 1984, largely for extraneous political
reasons.I° Regulation 2641/84 became effective on September 23, 1984.11
4. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done at Rome, Mar. 25, 1957,
art. 113, 298 U.N.T.S. 4, 60. The official English text is found at 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
3815.
5. See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2176/84, 27 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 201) 1, 2
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 3821 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Reg. 2176/84]. This regulation
superseded various predecessors on the same topics. See 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
§ 3816.07 (giving history of predecessor provisions).
6. Most importantly, Council Regulation (EEC) No. 288/82,25 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L35)
1,2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 3829 (1982). Again, this regulation is only the most recent in a
series of measures dealing with the same topic. See 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 3816.25 to
.29.
7. Reg. 2641/84, supra note 1, preamble 7.
8. See Proposal for a Council Regulation, COM(83) 87 final, p. 1 (Feb. 28, 1983) (Explana-
tory Memorandum).
9. Id.
10. See Financial Times, Sept. 18, 1984, at 5, col. 1.
11. See Reg. 2641/84, supra note 1, art. 14.
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A. PRACTICES SUBJECT TO THE REGULATION
The aims of Regulation 2641/84 are set forth in its first article: to establish
procedures for the purpose either (a) of removing injury resulting from any
"illicit commercial practice" of a non-member country or (b) of ensuring the
full exercise of the Community's rights with regard to the commercial
practices of other countries.' 2 In either case, the Regulation specifies that
the Community's responsive actions shall be "subject to compliance with
existing international obligations and procedures.,
13
The critical term "illicit commercial practices"is defined as "any interna-
tional trade practices attributable to third countries which are incompatible
with international law or with the generally accepted rules."' 4 An earlier
draft used the phrase "practices . . . which are incompatible with interna-
tional law or the rules commonly accepted by the Community's principal
partners regarding commercial policy."' 5 The change in the wording does
not appear to be material; it is clear in either case that the Regulation is
directed at practices that are either "incompatible with the commitments of
the non-member country concerned vis-A-vis the Community or, more
generally, . . . condemned by international law or the rules regarding com-
mercial policy commonly accepted by the Community's principal
partners."' 16 Two examples specifically cited by the Commission as falling
within the Regulation are restrictions on raw materials contrary to the
GATT and import restrictions or other charges that are incompatible with
the GAT.'
17
The Regulation's definition of unfair practices was intended to occupy a
middle ground between what the Commission regarded as two extremes.
On the one hand, the Commission wanted to avoid a particularized listing of
specific practices, an approach which inevitably would raise issues of com-
partmentalization and create the risk of gaps or under-inclusion. On the
other hand, the Community wanted to avoid a catch-all approach such as
that in section 301 of the United States Trade Act-reaching practices that
were "unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory"t 8 -- on the grounds
that such an approach would be too unstructured and arbitrary, might itself
create the risk of Community actions in violation of the GAIT, and could
raise excessive expectations among Community industries of official protec-
tive action which could not realistically be met. Adoption of a standard
based on international obligations and generally accepted rules of trade
conduct was intended to avoid either extreme.' 9
12. Id., art. 1(a) & (b).
13. Id., art. 1.
14. Id., art. 2(1).
15. Proposal for a Council Regulation, supra note 8, art. 2(2).
16. Id., p. 2 (Explanatory Memorandum).
17. Id., p. 2 n.1 (Explanatory Memorandum).
18. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B).
19. Proposal for a Council Regulation, supra note 8, pp. 1-2 (Explanatory Memorandum).
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Independently of the right to act against illicit trade practices, Regulation
2641/84 is also applicable when needed to ensure "full exercise of the
Community's rights with regard to the commercial practices of third
countries." 20 For this purpose the Community's rights are defined as "those
international trade rights of which [the Community] may avail itself either
under international law or under generally accepted rules." 21 As explained
in greater detail below, however, this more open-ended application of the
Regulation may not be invoked by private complainants.
On the chance that Regulation 2641/84 may prove self-confining in un-
foreseen circumstances, the Community expressly reserved the right to
proceed directly under Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome against any other
improper trade measures not falling within the scope of the Regulation. 22
B. THE INITIATION OF COMPLAINTS
Regulation 2641/84 may be invoked by any member state of the Commu-
nity, whether the objective is to confront an "illicit commercial practice" or
to ensure the "full exercise" of Community rights.23 More interesting,
however, is the right of a private party to invoke the Regulation, a right
which did not exist previously under Article 113 of the Treaty, at least not in
any formal sense.24
Private complainants must, however, meet certain specified require-
ments. First, they may challenge only illicit commercial practices of other
countries and may not invoke the broader "full exercise" arm of the
Regulation. 25 Further, a private party must demonstrate by its complaint
that it is acting on behalf of a Community industry which considers itself
injured by the challenged practice. 26 For these purposes, "Community
industry" is defined as Community producers who (a) produce products
identical to, similar to, or competitive with the product that is the subject of
the illicit practice or (b) are consumers or processors of the subject
product.27 The second part of this definition, which was not included in the
original Commission draft,28 significantly widens the availability of the
20. Reg. 2641/84, supra note 1, art. l(b).
21. Id., art 2(2).
22. Id., preamble 10 & art. 13.
23. Id., art. 4(1).
24. Obviously, a private party previously had the right to complain informally to the
Commission and to request the Commission to initiate action under Article 113.
25. Id., art. 3(1). See also Proposal for a Council Regulation, supra note 8, p. 3 (Explanatory
Memorandum) ("this right to submit [private] complaints direct should be accorded only in
respect of unfair commercial practices-i.e., cases covered under [article 1(a)]").
26. Reg. 2641/84, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
27. Id., art. 2(4).
28. Proposal for a Council Regulation, supra note 8, art. 2(4) (limiting the definition to
producers of identical, similar, or competitive products).
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Regulation, although it still falls short of granting standing to "[a]ny in-
terested person" as allowed under the comparable United States pro-
cedures.2 9 For the most part, a complainant must represent all or a major
portion of the relevant producers within the Community industry, although
Community producers who are affiliated with the subject foreign exporters
need not be included and, in particular circumstances, producers within a
single region of the Community may be a sufficient plaintiff group.
30
Every private complaint must also contain proof of injury. 31 The alleged
injury may be either existing or threatened, but in any event it must be
material.32 Evidence of injury must address three major topics: (a) the
volume of Community imports or exports involved, and particularly
whether there has been a significant increase or decrease; (b) prices, in
particular to determine whether there has been a significant undercutting of
the prices of Community producers, either in the Community itself or in
third countries; and (c) the consequent impact on the Community industry,
as indicated by trends in such economic factors as production, utilization of
capacity, stocks, sales and market shares, negative effects on prices or
profits, employment, and investment. 33 The showing with respect to injury
should, of course, exclude injury caused by extraneous factors. 34
C. THE PROCESSING OF COMPLAINTS
A major goal of Regulation 2641/84 is the speedy processing of trade
complaints. The initial step after receipt of a complaint is for the Commis-
sion to consult with an advisory committee of the member states. 35 The
consultation can be simply a brief written procedure,36 and its function is to
distinguish between complaints which justify investigation and those which
do not. Where the Commission concludes that the complaint does not
warrant further steps, it may terminate the proceeding after the consultation
stage. 37 If the Commission decides that further investigation is appropriate,
29. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a).
30. Reg. 2641/84, supra note 1, art. 2(4). The Community's Economic and Social Committee
had urged inclusion of this "regional interest" concept, which was already found in the
Community's antidumping and antisubsidy rules and is recognized by the GATT. See Opinion
of the Economic and Social Committee, 26 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 211) 24, 26 (1983).
31. Reg. 2641/84, supra note 1, art. 3(1). Where the complaint of a member state is directed
against an illicit commercial practice, it must also show injury. However, no injury showing
need be made under the "full exercise" clause. Id., art. 4(2).
32. Id., art. 2(3). In the case of alleged threatened injury, the anticipated injury must also be
clearly foreseeable. Id., art. 8(2).
33. Id., art. 8(1). This test of injury is substantially borrowed from the Community's
antidumping regulation. See Reg. 2176/84, supra note 5, art. 4(2).
34. Reg. 2641/84, supra note 1, art. 8(3).
35. Id., art. 5.
36. Id., art. 5(4).
37. Id., art. 3(5) & 4(4).
WINTER 1985
366 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
it will initiate an examination procedure. 38 This threshold decision-
whether to terminate the proceeding or initiate an examination procedure-
must be made within 45 days of receipt of the complaint, or within 60 days in
the case of (undefined) special circumstances. 39
Where an examination procedure is initiated, the Commission will first
publish a notice of the investigation in the Official Journal of the European
Community and also give notice to the country or countries which are the
subject of the complaint.n° Consultations with those governments may occur
at this stage, 4' but in most instances this will probably be deferred until the
completion of the investigation. The Commission may proceed with inde-
pendent fact-finding, and, if requested evidence is not supplied, the Com-
mission is entitled to rule on the basis of the evidence put before it by the
42complainant and other cooperating entities. 2 Confidential treatment may
be requested for submissions, but the Commission is the final judge as to
what will and will not be made public.43
As in the Community's procedures for antidumping complaints, 4 4 Reg-
ulation 2641/84 provides for the possibility of a hearing with the Commission
and meetings among the adverse parties so that the Commission may hear
opposing arguments and rebuttal. 45 At such meetings, however, parties may
withhold confidential information, and the failure to attend may not be
prejudicial to their case.46 Thus, as is often the case with Commission
proceedings in other areas (particularly, antidumping and antitrust), there
are only limited opportunities for the accused to confront its accusers and
rebut their evidence. Moreover, in borrowing from its antidumping proce-
dures to frame these administrative procedures, the Commission made no
adjustment for the fact that proceedings under Regulation 2641/84 will
typically be directed at the actions of governments rather than of private
parties. Whether a nonmember government, such as the United States,
would be willing to participate in the Commission's administrative proceed-
ings may be questioned. Further, the retaliatory response arising from a
Regulation 2641/84 proceeding may, for strategical reasons, be directed at
products of the offending country that differ from the products involved in
38. Id., art. 6(1).
39. Id., art. 6(8).
40. Id., art. 6(1)(a) & (b).
41. Id., art. 6(1)(b).
42. Id., art. 6(2) & (7).
43. If the Commission concludes that a request for confidentiality is unwarranted and if the
supplier is unwilling either to make the information public or to authorize its disclosure in
generalized form, the information will be disregarded. Id., art. 7(4). But in any event, the
Commission remains free to disclose "general information" and, in particular, the reasons on
which its decisions are taken. Id., art. 7(5).
44. See Reg. 2176/84, supra note 5, art. 7(5) & (6).
45. Reg. 2641/84, supra note 1, art. 6(5) & (6).
46. Id., art. 6(6).
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the unfair practice at issue. This again raises the question whether, at the
administrative level at least, the Commission's proceedings are likely to
result in a full airing of the economic and legal issues relevant to both the
complaint of unfair practice and to the question of relief.
D. DECISION AND ULTIMATE ACTION
The Commission will normally be expected to submit its report to the
advisory committee of member states within five months after initiating an
examination procedure. 47 After discussion in the committee, the Commis-
sion is directed to adopt a decision, which then is subjected to a "guillotine"
procedure: the decision becomes effective unless, within ten days, a mem-
ber state refers the matter to the Council. By majority vote the Council may
revise the decision, but if no Council action is taken in thirty days the
Commission's decision as submitted becomes effective.48 Thus an objecting
member state has the burden not only of appealing to the Council but also of
gaining majority support at the Council within thirty days. Moreover, an
interested private party has no independent appeal rights to the Council; it
may protect its position only through a cooperative member state.
The Commission decision is not the last word, however. Where the
Community is precluded by the GATT or other international agreement
from taking unilateral measures against an illicit commercial practice, the
Commission will pursue the required consultative or dispute-settlement
procedures with the targeted country. The Community's negotiating posi-
tion concerning the initiation, conduct, and termination of the international
procedures will be governed by the guillotine procedure just described. 49
However, after conclusion of the international procedures, an affirmative
majority vote of the Council is needed before responsive action may actually
be taken. 50 Hence, for GATT signatories such as the United States, the
Community's principal political body-the Council-ultimately must agree
by majority vote to any action which would fall within the GATT
framework.
With respect to what kinds of action may ultimately be taken, Regulation
2641/84 requires only that they be "compatible with existing international
obligations and procedures."5 1 This presumably incorporates the traditional
international-law restrictions of proportionality and equivalency. 52 Possible
forms of retaliation that are specifically identified in the Regulation are: (a)
47. Id., art. 6(9). Seven months are allowed for unusually complex proceedings. Id.
48. Id., art. 12.
49. Id., art. 11(2)(a).
50. Id., art. 11(2)(b).
51. Id., art. 10(3).
52. Under both articles XIX and XXIII of the GATT, supra note 3, it is recognized that
retaliation should be limited to the suspension of equivalent obligations or concessions.
WINTER 1985
368 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
suspension or withdrawal of any concession resulting from commercial
policy negotiations; (b) the raising of existing customs duties or the intro-
duction of any other charge on imports; and (c) the introduction of quantita-
tive restrictions or any other measures modifying import or export condi-
tions or otherwise affecting trade with the third country concerned.53
II. Potential Implications
Undoubtedly, regulation 2641/84 has increased the hazards of trade with
the European Common Market. Alarmism would be ill-advised, but the fact
remains that the Regulation is now on the books and not likely to be
ignored, either by the Commission or certainly by European industries. The
avowed purpose of the Regulation is to strengthen the Community's hand in
trade disputes with its trading partners, of which the United States is most
important. Moreover, the Regulation gives a new avenue by which Euro-
pean industries can bring complaints to political levels within the Commu-
nity and demand decision and action. None of this can be comforting to the
United States business executive selling into Europe, who faces new risks of
becoming embroiled in economic and political battles over which he will
have little control.
This is not to say that the Community will frequently impose sanctions
under Regulation 2641/84. Just as section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act has
never been the source of unilateral import action by the United States,
Regulation 2641/84 will rarely run its full course. In most instances, as with
section 301, the Regulation procedures will probably be initiated at the early
stages of a trade dispute for purposes of leverage, but a negotiated solution
will result in a suspension or termination of formal proceedings before final
Council action on sanctions.54 The Regulation will have an 'impact, but the
ultimate weapon of unilateral action will rarely be invoked.
As a practical matter, what can a United States firm do to avoid embroil-
ment with Regulation 2641/84 and with the political and economic battles in
which its procedures will be invoked? In many instances, very little. The
Regulation is focused on the trade practices of governments, not of private
firms. Accordingly, even the most cautious United States company might be
caught in a Regulation proceeding because of United States government
actions which the private company neither sought nor benefited from.
53. Reg. 2641/84, supra note 1, art. 10(3).
54. This is contemplated by the Regulation itself, which provides for termination of proceed-
ings where the targeted third country or countries have taken corrective steps. The Commission
is instructed to monitor implementation of those corrective steps, and may reinstitute the
proceedings on a prompt basis where appropriate. Id., art. 9(2). In its initial proposal for the
Regulation, the Commission observed that the initiation of formal examination procedures
under the Regulation should itself bring political and economic pressure on target countries.
Proposal for a Council Regulation, supra note 8, p. 3 (Explanatory Memorandum).
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Presumably in some instances, though, the United States company will have
some control over its destiny. One can anticipate that the retaliatory actions
which a European industry might seek under the Regulation will, if possible,
focus on those United States firms which are perceived to have inspired the
United States trade practice under attack. Where, for example, the United
States widget industry seeks restrictions from Congress, the United States
Trade Representative, or the International Trade Commission on the im-
portation of European widgets into the United States, the United States
industry's exports of widgets to Europe will be a jeopardy if the Europeans
are likely to conclude that the proposed United States government action
would be improper under the GATT. Retaliation was always possible in the
past, but Regulation 2641/84 raises it to a higher level of likelihood.
Thus the obvious lesson to be drawn for the United States firm is to
analyze carefully the implications for its European sales before seeking
United States government relief with respect to imports from Europe.
Regulation 2641/84 provides an obvious stimulus for European competitors
to initiate counter-proceedings in Brussels, with the likely result that the
matter will quickly be escalated to the political level where the United States
firm may have little control over the outcome. Indeed, the European coun-
ter-proceeding may largely coincide in time with the United States one,
since-as mentioned-Regulation 2641/84 may be involved in the case of
threatened injury, 55 and presumably the Europeans will conclude that their
leverage would be more effectively applied in preventing unwanted United
States actions than in seeking their termination. Again, this suggests that
United States trade proceedings are likely to be affected even more than
presently by a heavy dosage of international politics.
Finally, when a United States firm finds its trade is jeopardized by a
Regulation 2641/84 proceeding, it must, of course, consider the desirability
of seeking to participate as a concerned party. 56 The risks of participating
would include the danger of disclosure of business data that the United
States firm considers confidential but which the Commission does not. 57
There is also the expense of a European legal proceeding. But to ignore the
proceeding is also risky, particularly because the Commission is authorized
to rely entirely on the adverse evidence of complainants if others do not
provide rebuttal evidence.58 The early proceedings under the Regulation
will bear careful watching, to see whether their level of procedural fairness
and objectivity is sufficient to inspire reasonable confidence that participa-
tion by United States respondents may contribute to favorable results.
55. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
57. See supra text accompanying note 43.
58. See supra text accompanying note 42.
WINTER 1985

